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Direct Taxation and Member State
Liability in the European Community
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) contemplates many new issues each year.
Two areas in which the ECJ has either recently rendered decisions or is currently
debating are: (1) taxation between Member States of the European Community
(EC), and (2) the collection of damages against Member States in relation to the
Brasserie du Pecheur case recently decided by the court. This article addresses
both these issues.

I. Direct Taxes and European Community Law
The focus of the following inquiry is primarily on whether and the extent to which
certain tax laws of the Member States are in compliance with Community law, in
particular with the nondiscrimination principle. At this time, the EC does not have
the explicit authority to levy direct taxes (e.g., personal or corporate income taxes);
only the Member States have this right. Nowhere does the EC Treaty confer express
authority to harmonize the direct taxes of the Member States.' However, it is well

Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article, or a part thereof,
in any not-for-profit publication or handout provided such material acknowledges original publication
in this issue of The InternationalLawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the authors.
*Marianna M. McGowan is a J.D. candidate (1997) at Southern Methodist University. She is
symposium editor, Southern Methodist University School of Law Student Editorial Board for The
InternationalLawyer.
**Daniel W. Koenig is a J.D. Candidate (1997) at Southern Methodist University. He is the article
editor, Southern Methodist University School of Law Student Editorial Board for The International
Lawyer.
1. No provisions in the EC Treaty confer express authority to harmonize the direct taxation of
the Member States, as does article 95 in relation to indirect taxation. Case C-279/93, Finanzamt K61nAltstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225, 231, para. 17. However, the Member States' direct tax
laws may be harmonized on the bases of article 100 of the EC Treaty. Note: For the sake of consistency,
reference will be made throughout this article to the European Community (EC) Treaty-previously
the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty-as it was amended at Maastricht by the Treaty on
European Union. For the full citation to the EC Treaty, see infra note 3.
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established that the income tax laws of the Member States must not violate Community law.2 In a growing number of cases, taxpayers have challenged the "constitutionality" of certain Member State tax laws, claiming that these laws violate the
nondiscrimination principle and certain other provisions of the EC Treaty.
In addition to the specific Treaty provisions, which more directly speak to the
principle of nondiscrimination, the goals of the EC set forth in the preamble to
the EC Treaty evidence the basic and fundamental role of the nondiscrimination
principle in the establishment of the EC. These goals include the establishment
of an "even closer union"; the elimination of barriers to ensure economic and
social progress; the desire to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade, and
fair competition; and finally, the need to strengthen the unity of the Member
State economies and ensure harmonious development by eliminating existing
differences. 3 These goals could not realistically be conceived without the guiding
presence of a principle of nondiscrimination. In order to achieve these goals,
however, it is necessary to eliminate the tax differences that exist among the
Member States. The Ruding Committee4 concluded in its 1992 report that the
tax differences among the Member States were unlikely to be reduced through
the independent action of the Member States.' Rather, it found that measures
agreed to at the Community level would be necessary to eliminate discrimination
and to ensure national corporate harmonization. 6
In addition to analyzing the recent line of ECJ opinions interpreting the Treaty
provisions dealing specifically with nondiscrimination, the discussion attempts
to shed some light on the implications for the future of the EC and its continued
structural development. That is, what effect will these cases have on the future
role of the ECJ regarding the harmonization of Member State direct taxation
policy? How far will the ECJ go in determining that a Member State's tax legislation is not only overtly discriminatory, but also covertly discriminatory? 7 The
2. Even though certain matters have been left for the Member States, such as social security,
the conditions for the award of university diplomas, and direct taxation, the Member States must
still adopt rules in those areas that respect the basic principles of freedom laid out by Community
law, i.e., the principle of nondiscrimination as established in articles 48, 52, and 59 of the EC Treaty.
Id. at 1-232, para. 24.
3. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 31, reprinted in
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573. These same goals and objectives have been reaffirmed in the opening
remarks of the Treaty on European Union, 1992 O.J. (C224) 31, reprinted in [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
719.
4. The Ruding Committee was a committee of independent experts set up by the Commission
to inquire into the impact that the differences in taxation would have on the internal market and to
propose measures to be taken in order to mitigate or eliminate the distortions. Jan E. Brinkmann &
Andreas 0. Riecker, European Company Taxation: The Ruding Committee Report Gives Harmonization Efforts a New Impetus, 27 INT'L LAW. 1061, 1066-67 (1993).
5. Id. at 1068.
6. Id.
7. The EC Treaty has been interpreted as prohibiting not only overt or direct discrimination
by reason of nationality, but also covert or indirect forms of discrimination, which, through the
application of other forms of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result. Case 152/73, Sotgui v.
Deutsche Bundespost, 1974 E.C.R. 153, para. 11.
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frequent use of the article 177 preliminary ruling procedure is also briefly
addressed, as well as its important role in both the ECJ's efforts to harmonize
Member State laws and to define a new role for itself. The analysis suggests that
the response of the Member States to the judicial activism of the ECJ-with
respect to its interpretations of the nondiscrimination provisions-demonstrates
Member State acceptance and approval of the changing role of the ECJ and the
likely need to work towards the establishment of a more complex EC judicial
system similar to the federal system in the United States.
H. Case Law of the ECJ Addressing the Nondiscrimination Provisions
A. How

COMMUNITY LAW

Is

ABLE TO IMPACT THE MEMBER STATES

The case law of the ECJ clearly establishes the supremacy of Community law
over Member State law. 8 Therefore, Community law supersedes Member State
law whenever the two conflict. 9 With this in mind, the significance of the recent
ECJ decisions essentially declaring Member State tax provisions to be "unconstitutional" and in violation of Community law becomes readily apparent. As one
of the fundamental principles of the EC, the principle of nondiscrimination is
directly applicable.l° The "direct effect" that Community law may or may not
have can be determinative of the real effectiveness of Community law. 1 The
ECJ's development of the doctrine of direct effect is said to be one of its most
significant accomplishments. 12 In the landmark Van Gend en Loos case, the ECJ
depicted the EC as a new type of legal order for which the Member States had
limited their sovereign rights, and consequently, granted individual citizens rights
as subjects of the Community."
B.

THE NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS

Because the principle of nondiscrimination has been held to be directly applicable, the ECJ has widely interpreted this principle and applied it strictly. 14 Article
6 of the EC Treaty provides: "Within the scope of application of this Treaty,
and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited." 5 However, it is well estab8. Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per L'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), 1 C.M.L.R. 1425
(1964); Case 106/77, Admin. de fin. de l'Etat v. Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629.
9. Servaas van Thiel, The Prohibitionof Income Tax Discriminationin the European Union:
What Does It Mean?, 34 EUR. TAX. 303 (1994).
10. Id. at 304.
11. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 182
(1993).
12. Paul P. Craig, Once upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalizationof EC

Law, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (1992).
13. Id. at 459.

14. Van Thiel, supra note 9, at 304.
15. EC TREATY, supra note 3, at 591.
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lished in the case law of the ECJ that article 6 will apply only if none of the
more specialized articles of the EC Treaty come into play. 16 These more specialized articles of the EC Treaty include article 48"7 (free movement of labor);
article 5218 (freedom of establishment); article 5819 (companies or forms treated
as natural persons who are nationals of Member States); article 5920 (free movement of services); and article 6721 (free movement of capital).22 The articles
concerning free movement were declared to be directly applicable by the ECJ
in 1974.23 That these provisions are directly applicable means that a person whose
rights have been violated may seek protection from a national court by applying
Community law as opposed to the discriminatory national law.24 The case law

16. Van Thiel, supra note 9 (citing Merci Conventionali Porto di Genova, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5889,
5927, point 11).
17. Paragraph 2 of Article 48 provides: "Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of
any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment,
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment." 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 612 (1992).
18. Article 52 provides in pertinent part:
[R]estrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a member-State in the
territory of another member-State shall be abolished by progressive stages in the course
of the transitional period. Such progressive abolition shall also apply to restrictions
on the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member
State established in the territory of any member-State.
Id. at 613.
19. Article 58 provides in part:
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a member-State and having
their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the
Community shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as
natural persons who are nationals of member-States.
Id. at 616.
20. Article 59 provides in pertinent part:
[R]estrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall be progressively abolished during the transitional period in respect of nationals of member-States
who are established in a State of the Community other than that of the person for
whom the services are intended.
Id. at 617.
21. Article 67 provides in pertinent part:
[Miember-States shall progressively abolish between themselves all restrictions on
the movement of capital belonging to persons resident in member-States and any
discrimination based on nationality or on the place of residence of the parties or on
the place where such capital is invested.
Id. at 618.
22. Ruud A. Sommerhalder, Differences in Tax Treatment Between Resident and Non-resident
Individuals: In Conflict with EC Treaty?, 33 EUR. TAX. 101, 102 (1993).
23. Van Thiel, supra note 9, at 304 (citing Case 270/83, Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R.
359 (concerning the free movement of workers); Case 2-74, Reyners v. Belgium, 1974 E.C.R. 631
(concerning the freedom of establishment)).
24. Treaty rights are available to all persons that have a sufficient connection with the
Community. Natural persons must either have the nationality of one of the Member
States or be a member of a family of a migrant worker. Legal persons must be
incorporated in one of the Member States and have their seat (registered office, central
administration or principal place of business) within the Community.
Id. at n.16.
VOL. 31, NO. 1
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of the ECJ demonstrates that the basic freedoms not only contain a prohibition
against discrimination, but also a prohibition against unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions of the individual rights of the citizens of the EC.
C.

THE RECENT CASES ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES

The principle of nondiscrimination also plays an important role in cases involving the Member States' tax laws. The case law of the ECJ addressing this principle
is now discussed.
1. The Avoir Fiscal Case
In Commission v. France (the Avoir Fiscal case), the ECJ 25 decided for the
first time that different income tax treatment of residents and nonresidents could
possibly amount to discrimination in violation of the Treaty.26 The ECJ compared
France's treatment of a German insurance company and a French insurance
company that both invested on the Paris Stock Exchange through French branch
offices. 2' The provisions in the French income tax provided for equal treatment
with respect to dividend income; however, the imputation credit was given only
to the French company and not the German-based company. 2' Essentially, a
French subsidiary of a nonresident corporation could also apply these rules, but
agencies and permanent establishments could not.29
The ECJ ruled that the avoirfiscalviolated the freedom of establishment rule
of article 52, as well as that article's explicit language guaranteeing the freedom
to choose a legal form under which to do business,3 ° by essentially requiring the
establishment of a French corporation in order to receive certain tax advantages,
such as shareholders' tax credits.3 Servaas van Thiel points out that the ECJ
took great care to avoid stating that any distinction on the basis of residence was
prohibited. 32 Therefore, the general rule established by the ECJ in this case was

25. 1986 E.C.R. 273, 1 C.M.L.R. 401 (1987). Avoir Fiscal refers to the tax credit at issue in
this case.
26. Van Thiel, supra, note 9 at 305.
27. Id. at n.25.
28. The second paragraph of article 158 of the Code GeneralDes Impots provides that the benefit
of the shareholders' tax credit is granted only to persons who have their habitual residence or registered
office in France. Furthermore, according to article 242 quarterof the Code General Des Impots, that
benefit may be granted to persons resident in the territory of states that have concluded double-taxation
agreements with France. Case 270/83, Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273, 300, para. 4.
29. Id. at 300, para. 6.
30. Id. at 305, paras. 20-22; see also supra note 17.
31. Id. at 305, para. 20.
32. Van Thiel, supra note 9, at 305. Van Thiel goes on to point out that the ECJ also did not
go so far as to state that the different treatment of residents and nonresidents would never amount
to discrimination. Id. In fact, it has become well established in ECJ case law that "[iln relation to direct
taxes, the situations of residents and non-residents in a given State are not generally comparable." See
Case 80/94, Wielockx v. Inspecteur Der Directs Belastingen, 3 C.M.L.R. 85, 100, para. 18 (1995)
(citing Case 279/93, Finanzamt K61n-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225, 233, para. 31).
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that different income tax treatment of residents and nonresidents could, depending
on the circumstances, constitute discrimination. 33 Under the facts of this case,
the alleged discrimination was found to be unjustified in light of the goals of the
internal market.
The ECJ recognized that the fundamental principle underlying article 52 has
been directly applicable in the Member States since the beginning of the transition
period.34 With this in mind, the ECJ rejected the risk of increased tax avoidance
as a justification for covertly discriminatory tax provisions by saying that article
52 did not allow for such an exception to a fundamental Community principle.35
Despite the fact that the disadvantages levied against branches of foreign companies were compensated with certain advantages, such as not having to pay incorporation and registration duties, the ECJ refused to find a sufficient justification
for the unequal treatment.36 Even though the possibility remained that certain
types of discrimination might be sufficiently justifiable, the ECJ made it clear
that despite the lack of harmonization of corporate tax laws among the Member
States, discrimination against agencies and branches of insurance companies having their registered office in another Member State would be difficult to justify,
and was not justified in this case.37 More is said below on what the ECJ has
found to be adequate justification for unequal treatment.
2. The Daily Mail Case
While the ECJ seemed to adopt a judicially active approach in its efforts to
harmonize and get the Member States to jump on the EC bandwagon, the decision
in the Daily Mail case3" served as somewhat of a reality check. The case demonstrates a situation where the ECJ refused to apply Community law to an income
tax case that it considered to be outside the scope of Community authority. 39 At
the center of the controversy was the English Income and Corporation Taxes
Act of 1970. 40 Section 482(1)(a) of the Act required a corporation to obtain the
consent of the Treasury when seeking to transfer its central management and
control from the United Kingdom to another Member State while maintaining
its status as a United Kingdom corporation.4

33. Id.
34. Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273, 302, para. 13; see Reyners v. Belgian State, 1974
E.C.R. 631.
35. The principle referred to being that of freedom of establishment.
36. 1986 E.C.R. 273, 305, para. 21.
37. Van Thiel, supra note 9.
38. Case 81/87, Regina v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex parte Daily
Mail and General Trust P.L.C., E.C.R. 5483, 3 C.M.L.R. 713 (1988).
39. Van Thiel, supra note 9, at 306.
40. 3 C.M.L.R. at 725, para. 18. The pertinent provision of the English tax code has since been
repealed.
41. 3 C.M.L.R. at 722, para. 5.
VOL. 31, NO. I

EC DIRECT TAXATION

169

The basic question addressed by the ECJ was whether to allow a tax planning
scheme that relied on directly applicable Community law to invalidate national
legislation. 42 Because the concept of a directly applicable right precludes basing
that right on national law of any kind, Van Thiel finds it strange that the ECJ
would take the position that the right of emigration depends on the national laws
of incorporation. 43 One might question why the most pro-European institution
of the EC, the Commission, would also state that the application and enforcement
of a directly applicable provision of Community law is contingent upon the contents of a Member State's laws. It is well established that the failure of a Member
State to live up to its duties under the Treaty does not have an impact on the
directly applicable rights conferred to natural and legal persons." For this reason,
the Daily Mail decision has been criticized for its failure to abolish what is known
as the "seat rule," 45 which is viewed by some as a road block to the process of
harmonizing corporation laws within the EC.'
On the other hand, Ebke and Gockel viewed the Daily Mail decision as potentially serving to "revitalize the process of company law harmonization within
the EC. 47 In distinguishing this case from those traditionally considered to fall
under articles 52 and 58, the ECJ pointed out that corporations are created under
the laws of the individual Member States and that a Member State has the right
to regulate the affairs of corporations situated under its laws. 48 The fact that
article 58 confers upon Member States the right to require that domestic companies
maintain their corporate headquarters, or central administration, within its territory was of even greater importance in the ECJ's decision. 49 Ebke and Gockel
contend that the ECJ's opinion implicitly concludes:
[I]f secondary Community law 50 provides for the mutual recognition of companies
within the meaning of article 58(2) and the transferability of their seat from one country

42. Servaas van Thiel, Daily Mail Case: Tax Planningand the EuropeanRight of EstablishmentA Setback, 28 EUR. TAX. 357, 360 (1988). For the corporate law background of Daily Mail, see
Werner F. Ebke & Markus Gockel, Regional Developments: European Corporate Law, 24 INT'L
LAW. 239 (1990).
43. Van Thiel, supra note 42, at 362.
44. Id. at 364. This result seems to be the only sensible conclusion due to the fact that, by
definition, a directly applicable right does not depend on a Member State taking any legislative
action. Rather, a directly applicable right follows from Community law and preempts national legislative measures to the contrary. Id.
45. Under the "seat rule," the affairs of a corporation are governed by the law of the state in
which the corporation has its primary seat, or principal place of business, instead of by the law of
the state of incorporation. For a discussion of the corporate governance implications and the conflicts
of corporate laws issues of the Daily Mail decision, see Ebke & Gockel, supra note 42.
46. Ebke & Gockel, supra note 42, at 250 (citing Sandrock & Austmann, Das Internationale
Gesellschaftsrechtnach derDaily Mail-Entsheidungdes EuropischenGerichtshofs: Quo Vadis? 35
RIW 249 (1989)).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 249.
49. Id.
50. Particularly law within the meaning of articles 54 (3)(g) and 220(3).
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to another, neither the state of incorporation nor the host country have the right to
impose limitations on the recognition of foreign companies or the transfer of a company's
seat."
However, given the lack of such secondary Community law, the ECJ decided
that articles 52 and 58 did not grant corporations the right to transfer their headquarters to another Member State while retaining their corporate status under
the Member State of incorporation. 5 2 Rather than viewing the ECJ's decision as
a setback to the harmonization process and a missed opportunity to abolish the
"seat rule," the decision was viewed by some as one that would encourage the
harmonization of fundamental rules and principles of law concerning business
associations.
Despite the need for both broad and narrow interpretations of the text of the
Treaty during the formative years, which continue even to the present, the Member States are still not always eager to relinquish some of their powers to the
central authority. Perhaps with this in mind, the ECJ decided that the regulation
of business associations is an area in which the ECJ will exercise a certain amount
of judicial restraint and place the onus on the Community and the Member States
to further harmonization by means of directives or conventions. Nevertheless,
van Thiel considers the ECJ's decision to be a highly questionable interpretation
of article 2203 of the Treaty, which effectively limits the primary right of establishment for companies contrary to article 58 . Van Thiel contends that because
the right of establishment under articles 52 through 58 involves both the right
to exit the home Member State and the right to enter the host Member State, it
is difficult to reconcile how Great Britain is legally permitted to tax the company's
exit from its territory." The Daily Mail decision seems to have provided a possible
justification for Member State discrimination with respect to the freedom of
establishment and the movement of goods.
In the Daily Mail decision, the ECJ revealed its reluctance to allow the use
of Community law for the sole purpose of tax minimization. While the situation
was likely a case of tax avoidance, not tax evasion, the deference granted the
Member State in this situation might indicate a willingness of the ECJ to carve
out an exception for discrimination by Member States when they feel their national

51. Ebke & Gockel, supra note 42, at 249.
52. Id.
53. Article 220 of the EC Treaty provides:
Member-States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other
with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals: . . .- the abolition of double
taxation within the Community;-the mutual recognition of companies or firms within
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48, the retention of legalpersonality
in the event of transfer of their seat from one country to another, and the possibility
of mergers between companies or firms governed by the laws of different countries.
I C.M.L.R. 573, 711 (1992) (emphasis added).
54. Van Thiel, supra note 42, at 364.
55. Id. at 365.
VOL. 31, NO. I
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legislation serves the purpose of preventing abuse of the openness of the internal
market. Under this rationale, until adequate laws exist to assure the protection
of shareholders, creditors, and other third parties, and the laws of corporate
governance are more uniform among the Member States, a more narrow reading
of rights conferred under the Treaty may be given by the ECJ.
The fallback explanation for the decision of the ECJ, though a realistic and
pervasive consideration, involves the magnitude of the changes taking place and
the vast cultural differences that exist between the different Member States. The
fact that the laws governing the establishment and operation of business associations continue to be far from uniform is likely attributable to many of these
differences. Although the ECJ may be eager to push forward and further the
recognition of rights conferred under the Treaty, when the protection of a right
may in turn open the door for substantial abuses not yet accounted for by Community law, the ECJ will be less willing to find a violation of that right.
3. The Bachmann and Werner Cases
There are those, however, who prefer not to continue referring to the fallback
explanation whenever the ECJ upholds what appears to be a discriminatory national provision.56 Two more recent decisions of the ECJ are demonstrative of
situations in which a Member State would be justified in derogating from the
fundamental freedoms of articles 48, 52, 58, and 59. The 1992 Bachmann57 case
and the 1993 Werner58 case provided situations in which the ECJ refused to apply
Community law to income tax cases. The derogations from the fundamental
freedoms permitted in these cases, however, seem much easier to reconcile with
the overall objectives of the Community and to have been important aspects for
the ECJ to clarify.
In Bachmann, the ECJ held that a Member State's need to maintain a coherent
fiscal system was a justification for discriminatory income tax provisions.5 9 The
Belgian law at issue was article 54(2) of the Belgian Income Tax Code, which
provides that payment for supplementary life, health, or disability insurance can
be deductible from taxable income only if these payments are made to a company
established or having its place of management in Belgium. 60 Such a provision
would certainly seem to discriminate covertly based on nationality and therefore
be in violation of Community law, and the ECJ found this to be the case. Nevertheless, the ECJ allowed the restriction.

56. Nevertheless, these concerns will often prove to be obstacles that must be overcome and
taken into consideration any time the Member States are asked or required to sacrifice some element
of their sovereignty to the Community.
57. Case 204/90, Bachmann v. Belgian State, 1992 E.C.R. 1-249, 1 C.M.L.R. 785 (1993).
58. Case 112/91, Werner v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1993 E.C.R. 1-429.
59. Bachmann, 1992 E.C.R. at 1-283, para. 28.
60. Paul E. Boekhorst, Tax DiscriminationPermittedfor Reasons of Coherence of Tax System,
32 EUR. TAX. 284 (1992); see 1992 E.C.R. at 1-278, para. 3.
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The ECJ, in dismissing the possibility that consumer protection or the need
for effective tax control were sufficient justifications to allow for the infringement
of fundamental Community freedoms, went on to hold that the need to maintain
a coherent national tax system was a matter of public policy sufficient to justify
excluding the deductions. 61 The ECJ found it necessary to allow the Belgian tax
authorities to refuse the deduction of premiums paid to companies not established
in Belgium because there was no way to be certain that the capital sum or annuities
paid in consideration would ever be taxed in Belgium.62 Such a holding seems
to have been unavoidable given the lack of harmonization of Member State tax
laws concerning such insurance payments. 63 Until the time of total harmonization
of tax laws, or perhaps an EC-implemented tax system, such public policy exceptions will be permitted as a practical necessity.
Another reason why it would be impossible to have an absolute bar on discrimination in such a complex system stems from the diverse backgrounds and histories
of the EC Member States. While the double-taxation agreements 64 between individual Member States provide temporary solutions concerning the maintenance
of coherent fiscal systems, it will take time to work out their differences and
come to a point where the Member States believe that the advantages of uniformity
and harmonization outweigh the desire to maintain cultural identity and legal
sovereignty. In the meantime, the ECJ in Bachmann held that Member States
do retain their sovereignty in this regard so long as: (1) there is a lack of harmonization in the law; (2) there is a public policy concern of maintaining the coherence
of its national tax system; (3) the violation of the nondiscrimination clause is
proportional to the public policy goal; and (4) the national measure does not
consist of overt discrimination.65
61. Boekhorst, supra note 60, at 286; see Bachmann, 1992 E.C.R. at 1-283-84, paras. 28-29.
62. Case 80/94, Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directs Belastingen, E.C.R. 1-2493, 2516, para.
23, 3 C.M.L.R. 85 (1995) (citing Bachmann, 1992 E.C.R. 1-249). In Wielockx, the ECJ distinguished
Bachmann, finding that cohesion of the fiscal system does not justify discrimination where the debtor
in relation to the pensions-the undertaking-remains established in the Netherlands. This scenario
was found to provide an adequate safeguard that would enable the State to collect tax on the pensions.
Wielockx, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-2506, paras. 64-65.
63. Bachmann, 1992 E.C.R. at 1-283, paras. 26-27. The ECJ held that
"[tlhe cohesion of such a tax system, the formulation of which is a matter for each
Member State, therefore presupposes that, in the event of a state being obliged to
allow the deduction of. . . contributions paid in another Member State, it should be
able to tax sums payable by insurers."
Id. at 1-282, para. 23.
64. Under agreements similar to the Model Double-Taxation Convention on Income and on
Capital, Report of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD, 1977, the Member States have
generally agreed to obtain cohesion
"at another level: the State taxes all pensions received by residents in its territory,
whatever the State in which the contributions were paid. Conversely, it waives the
right to tax pensions received abroad even if they derive from and are made in consideration of contributions paid in its territory which it treated as deductible."
Wielockx, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-2505, paras. 53-54.
65. Boekhorst, supra note 60, at 286.
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Another case in which the ECJ refrained from intervening in national tax
matters was the Werner case. 66 In this case the ECJ held that the freedom of
establishment of article 52 does not preclude a Member State from taxing its
own nationals at a higher rate if they decide to live in another Member State.67
Werner, a German dentist residing in the Netherlands, sought protection under
the nondiscrimination rules of the EC Treaty because he was taxed by Germany as
a nonresident and was therefore deprived of certain benefits granted to residents.68
Rather than addressing the substance of this case, the ECJ merely regarded
the case as a domestic affair. 69 The ECJ did not consider Wernerto be an interstate
case probably because the taxpayer was a German citizen who was subject to
German income taxation (with respect to the income he derived from German
sources). However, Sommerhalder does not find this decision to be in line with
the judgment of the ECJ in the Biehl case, where the ECJ held that nationality
and residence can be effectively linked.7' The Biehl case is discussed further
below; however, the decision in Werner can be viewed as a decision by the ECJ
not to intervene when it is not entirely clear that the allegedly discriminatory
national tax provisions will have any intra-Community ramifications. This case
was, after all, one in which the national was claiming that his own nation was
discriminating against him. For this reason, the ECJ found no discrimination
within the meaning of the EC Treaty 7 and therefore saw no need to address the
substantive issues of the matter. 72
From this decision, it appears that the ECJ is not yet ready to intervene in the
domestic affairs of its Member States in order to prevent what seems to be, as
Sommerhalder points out, discrimination within the meaning of the EC Treaty.
The ECJ seems to be saying that it is tolerable to discriminate against your own
nationals. 7 3 The decision in Werner sends a strong message with respect to the
separation of powers: if a matter is domestic in nature, the ECJ will refrain from
intervening.
66. Werner, 1993 E.C.R. 1-429.
67. Sommerhalder, supra note 22, at 101.
68. Id.
69. Van Thiel, supra note 9, at 306-07.
70. Sommerhalder, supra note 22, at 104.
71. Id.
72. Arguably another reason why the Werner case was not considered to be an interstate case
invoking the provisions of the EC Treaty was the presence of the double taxation agreement concluded
between Germany and the Netherlands on June 16, 1959. Werner, 1993 E.C.R. at 1-469. That such
agreements recognize a distinction between residents and nonresidents (see id. at 1-449)-in granting
a state the ability to fully tax the income of nonresidents who derive all or substantially all of their
income in that state-enabled the ECJ to conclude that "[t]he only factor which takes [Werner's]
case out of a purely national context is the fact that he lives in a Member State other than that in
which he practises his profession." Id. at 1-470.
73. Sommerhalder points out the irony of a nonresident being placed in a more burdensome
position than nonresidents who are nationals of other Member States. He finds it quite clear that the
freedom of establishment principle has been violated for the German nonresident and finds no arguments of public policy that would justify such a violation. Sommerhalder, supra note 22, at 104.
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4. The Schumacker and Wielockx Cases
The issues in the Schumacker 74 case, though somewhat similar to those in
the Werner case, carried one major distinction that enabled the ECJ to reach
a substantive decision on the matter: the distinction being that it involved the
discrimination of a Member State against a nonnational. The Schumacker case
involved a Belgian national who resided in Belgium, but who worked in Germany
and earned almost all his income there.75
The intra-Community ramifications of the ECJ's decision are readily apparent
in this case. Therefore, the ECJ held that article 48 must be interpreted as capable
of limiting the conditions a Member State can lay down concerning the tax liability
of a national of another Member State, as well as how it goes about levying taxes
on the income received by these nonnationals within its territory.76 The rationale
of the ECJ strictly adhered to the nondiscrimination principle. The ECJ continued:
Article 48 does not allow a Member State, as regards the collection of direct taxes, to
treat a national of another Member State employed in the territory of the first State in
the exercise of his right of freedom of movement less favorably than one of its own
nationals in the same situation.77
Holding true to its decision in the Werner case, the ECJ stated that a Member
State's failure to grant a nonresident certain tax benefits that it does grant to a
resident is not, as a rule, discriminatory, because those two categories of taxpayers
are not similarly situated. 7' However, in the instant case, the taxpayer was not
able to claim the benefits of "splitting ' 79 in Belgium, because he had virtually
no taxable income there, whereas under German tax laws, he could not take
advantage of the "splitting" provisions of Germany's Income Tax Code because
his wife's income was not taxable in Germany due to the fact that she was a
nonresident. s The ECJ went on to find that discrimination does arise in such a
situation in which a nonresident receives the major part of his income and nearly
all of his family income in a Member State other than that of his residence. 8
The reason for this conclusion is that personal and family circumstances, which
would normally be considered by a person's state of residence, are not, in this
situation, taken into account by either his state of residence (because he has no

74. Finanzamt K61n-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225, 2 C.M.L.R. 450 (1996).
75. Id. at 1-254-55, para. 15.
76. Id. at 1-256, para. 24.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 1-260, para. 34.
79. Under a "splitting" tax regime, of which only married employed persons who are not
permanently separated can take advantage, the total income of the spouses is aggregated, attributed
50 percent to each spouse, and then taxed accordingly. See Schumacker, 2 C.M.L.R. at 471, para.

7. The purpose of the "splitting" regime is to mitigate the progressive nature of the income tax
rates by making the taxable income of each spouse the same. Id.
80. Id. at 472, paras. 15-17.
81. Id. at 1-261, para. 38.
VOL. 31, NO. I

EC DIRECT TAXATION

175

income there and is therefore not liable to pay taxes there) or his state of employment (because he is not a resident there). 82
It is through the required accounting efforts that the ECJ really intervenes and
has an effect on the tax procedures of the Member States. 3 In a situation such
as Schumacker's, the ECJ recognizes that it is difficult for the state of residence
to take account of the taxpayer's personal and family circumstances, because the
tax payable in that state is insufficient. 4 Here, the principle of equal treatment
requires that the state of employment take into account the personal and family
circumstances of a nonnational, nonresident, and grant that person the same tax
benefits that it would to a resident national. 85 Germany quickly responded to the
ECJ's decision by allowing nonresident taxpayers certain tax benefits, at least
86
under certain circumstances.
In the spirit of Bachmann, the ECJ also looked for a justification for the
distinctions, such as the need to maintain a coherent tax system.87 The ECJ,
however, did not find such a justification.88 The Finanzamt (Germany's Internal
Revenue Service) argued that the distinctions were justified by the administrative
difficulties that would stem from requiring the state of employment to discover
the income that nonresidents working in its territory received in their state of
residence.89 In response to this argument, the ECJ pointed out that Council Direc-

82. Id. The argument put forth by Sommerhalder above can now be better appreciated. The label
"resident" distinguished Werner from Schumacker. The fact that Werner maintained his residence in
Germany permitted the German tax authorities to discriminate against him absent any EC Treaty
violations. Because the issue in Schumacker is focused on the covert discrimination against a nonnational, the EC Treaty discrimination protection devices apply and the ECJ comes to the rescue. Does
this seem right?
83. Id. at 1-262, para. 41.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Jahressteuergesetz 1996 (Oct. 11, 1995), BGBI. 1995 11250. This statute revised section
1, paragraph 3 of Germany's Income Tax Law (Einkommensteuergesetz 1990, published in BGBI,
1990 1 1898, corrected BGBI. 1991 I 808) to entitle a nonresident EC citizen, upon application, to
be taxed in Germany like a resident taxpayer if 90 % of his or her income is subject to income taxation
in Germany or if his or her income not subject to income taxation in Germany does not exceed DM
12,000 (approx. US$8,000). The amount is doubled (i.e., DM 24,000) in the case of a married
taxpayer. Id. Married taxpayers may also now opt for tax "splitting" even if the spouse of the
nonresident EC taxpayer subject to income taxation in Germany is not residing in Germany. BGBI.
1995 1 1250, § la. For an explanation of "splitting," see supra note 79. This new law allows the
nonresident taxpayer to receive the same tax benefits (e.g., tax splitting) as resident taxpayers. Under
the old law, such benefits were not available to nonresident taxpayers. However, as Professor Ebke
points out, the ECJ's decision of June 27, 1996, in the case of P.H. Asscher v. Staatssecretaris von
Financien, Case 107/94, 7 EUROPAEISCHES WIRTSCHAFrs- UND STEUERRECHT 285 (1996), the 90%/
DM 12,000 rule also seems to be inconsistent with the EC Treaty. Electronic-mail transmission from
Werner F. Ebke, Associate Editor of The InternationalLawyer, at the University of Konstanz,
Germany (Oct. 31, 1996).
87. Schumacker, 2 C.M.L.R. at 1-261-62, paras. 40-41.
88. Id. at 1-262, para. 42.
89. Id. para. 43.
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tive (EC) 77/799 [1977] concerning mutual assistance of the Member States
provides for ways of obtaining this information. 9°
The ECJ concluded that article 48 requires equal treatment at the procedural
level for nonresident Community nationals and resident nationals. 9' Therefore,
a provision of Member State law on direct taxation under which the benefits of
certain procedures and deductions are available only to residents, and excludes
nonresidents who are employed there and receive income, is precluded. 92
The ECJ recently followed the Schumacker decision in the Wielock 93 case.
Mr. Wielockx, a resident and national of Belgium, was a partner in a physiotherapy practice in the Netherlands and received all of his income in the Netherlands.9
Wielockx attempted to deduct from his taxable income contributions he made to
a voluntary pension-reserve, but was refused the deduction by the tax authorities.95
The Act 96 establishing the pension-reserve enabled self-employed persons to set
aside a portion of the profits from their business as a pension-reserve, while
allowing the amounts set aside to stay in the business. 97 The reserved funds are
liquidated upon the retirement of the taxpayer at the age of sixty-five, at which
time the reserve is treated as income. 98 Because under Dutch law, only residents,
but not nonresidents, may deduct the amounts contributed to the pension-reserve,
the ECJ was asked to determine whether the pension-reserves were compatible
with article 52 of the EC Treaty. 99
In arriving at its decision, the ECJ reiterated its well-established position that
discrimination arises when those similarly situated are treated differently, or
those situated differently are treated the same.'00 Referring to Schumacker, the
ECJ found that the nonresident Wielockx was objectively in a similar fiscal
situation as a resident due to the fact that all of his income was earned in the
Netherlands-his state of employment. 10' In this type of situation, the different
treatment of residents and nonresidents can amount to discrimination.' 02 Therefore, the Court concluded that "a nonresident taxpayer who . . . receives all or
90. Id. at 1-263, para. 45. More particularly, the ECJ points out that the tax agreement between
Germany and the Netherlands already works essentially the same way as the ECJ is proposing in
this case that Germany avoid discriminating against nonnationals that work on its territory. Account
must be taken in that agreement of the personal and family circumstances of the frontier workers.
Id. at 1-263, para. 46.
91. Id. at 1-266, para. 58.
92. Id. at para. 59.
93. Case C-80/94, G.H.EJ. Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directs Belastingen, 1995 E.C.R.
1-2493, 3 C.M.L.R. 85 (1995).
94. Id. at 1-2496, para. 9.
95. Id. at 1-2512, para. 11.
96. Nederlandse wet op de inkomnstenbelasting 1964, Staatsblad[Stb] 612 (1964).
97. Wielockx, at 1-2495, para. 3.
98. Id. at 1-2495, para. 4.
99. Id. at 1-2511-12, paras. 7, 12.
100. Id. at 1-2515, para. 17.
101. Id. at 100, para. 20.
102. Id.at 91, para. 23.
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almost all of his income in the State where he works but who is not entitled to
set up a pension reserve qualifying for deductions under the same tax conditions
as a resident taxpayer suffers discrimination. -103 The discrimination occurs because the nonresident's overall tax burden will be greater than that of a similarly
situated resident taxpayer due to the nonresident's inability to take the deduction.3'04
The tax authorities of the Netherlands then attempted to argue that the discrimination was justified on the grounds of fiscal cohesion as set forth in Bachmann.'05
More specifically, the Court was asked to consider whether the disallowance of
the deduction was justified in light of the existence of a double-taxation agreement
between the Netherlands and Belgium. '06 Under this agreement, the payments
received from the pension by the taxpayer at the age of sixty-five would be
taxed by the state of residence and not the state of employment-from which the
deductions are currently sought to be made.' 07
The ECJ found that the provisions of the double-taxation agreement eliminated
the need for a strict correlation between the deduction of contributions and the
taxation of payments received from the pensions later on.108 The Member States,
through the double-taxation agreement, essentially "shifted [fiscal cohesion] to
another level, that of the reciprocity of the rules applicable in the Contracting
States."'9 The ECJ concluded that because the double-taxation agreement between the Netherlands and Belgium served to provide fiscal cohesion (though at
"another level"), the "principle [of fiscal cohesion] may not be invoked to justify
the refusal of a deduction such as that in issue."" 0
While accepting the rationale of the Court, the Advocate General suggested
that the Court interpret these double-taxation agreements with caution, before
inferring that a Member State intentionally waived its desire to have a strict,
personal correlation between deductions taken and taxes paid.", The Advocate
General then provided an alternate rationale distinguishing the situation in the
instant case with that in Bachmann-where the discriminatory provision was
found to be justified. 112 He found the fact that the assets of the pension reserve
remain in the state of the undertaking until liquidation provided a more substantial
safeguard against a pension beneficiary taking the deductions, but avoiding the
payment of taxes upon receipt of the income.1"' Nevertheless, "the rights con103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 100, para. 22.
Id. para. 21.
Id. para. 23.
Id. at 99, para. 14.
Id.
Id. at 100-101, para. 24.
Id. at 101, para. 54.
Id. para. 25.
Id. at 96, para. 56.
Id. at 96-97, paras. 59-68.
Id. at 96-97, paras. 61, 65.
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ferred by article 52 of the Treaty are unconditionaland a Member State cannot
make respect for them subject to the contents of an agreement concluded with
another Member State."1 4 For this reason, a tax provision discriminating against
a similarly situated nonresident cannot be justified on grounds that two Member
States have agreed to tax income received from a pension in the state of residence.
The determining characteristic in Schumacker and Wielockx seemed to be the
similarity of the situations between the nonresident and resident, both of whom
made most or all of their income in the same taxing state." 5 In these cases, the
ECJ determined that discrimination can be found upon the unequal treatment of
a nonnational, nonresident. However, as we saw in the Werner case, there was
no discrimination in a situation involving a German national, who was established
in Germany as a dentist, but who happened to reside in the Netherlands, and
was denied certain German tax benefits because he was being taxed as a nonresident. " 6 The holding was that a state could differentiate among the tax treatment
of its own nationals, more specifically, between those who choose to live within
its borders and those who choose to live elsewhere. " 7 This rationale supports
the notion that it is impossible for a Member State to discriminate against its
own nationals, even though their situation is similar to that of a nonresident,
nonnational." s Is not residency effectively connected to nationality in such a
situation? To address this question, the Biehl decision is considered.
5. The Biehl Case
In the Biehl" 9 case, a German worker, who had left Luxembourg before the
end of the year, was not able to obtain a refund of excess withheld wages tax
because he had become a resident of Germany.120 The refund was denied Biehl
because the Luxembourg tax laws required that in order to receive a refund, a
taxpayer must be a resident throughout the entire year.' The ECJ held, with
respect to the EC Treaty principle prohibiting overt and covert discrimination
based on nationality, 2 2 that there is covert discrimination if there is a danger
that the tax provisions are disadvantageous to taxpayers who are nationals of
other Member States. 23 The ECJ went on to find the Luxembourg tax law discrim24
inatory. 1
114. Id. at97, para. 67 (quoting Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273, para. 26 (emphasis
added by Advocate General)).
115. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225, para. 37.
116. Sommerhalder, supra note 22, at 101.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 104 (refer again to Sommerhalder's argument in note 73 supra).
119. Case 175/88, Biehl v. Administration des Contributions du Grand-Duche, 1990 E.C.R.
1-1779.
120. Id. paras. 3-4.
121. Id. para. 6.

122. EC TREATY art. 48(2).
123. Boekhorst, supra note 60, at 285.
124. Id.
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The reasoning of the Court was that the residence criterion mainly affected
those of another nationality, because they were the ones most likely to return to
their home state after leaving employment in the previous state.' 25 Under these
circumstances, the ECJ found residence and nationality sufficiently linked so as
to amount to discrimination based on nationality. 21 6 The ECJ solidified its prior
case law, notably the Avoir Fiscaldecision, in that it refused to allow a covertly
discriminatory tax provision to be justified by the risk of increased tax avoidance. 12 7 The Court again rejected, as it did in Avoir Fiscal,the Member State's
concern that the balance of its system of progressive taxation would be upset. 28
The ECJ's decision in Biehl helped demonstrate, among other things, the ECJ's
reluctance to allow Member States to justify the implementation of covertly discriminatory tax provisions. Similar taxing requires the same access to tax advantages that stem from the payment of those taxes, regardless of whether the taxpayer
claims the particular Member State as his residence. 2 9 The ECJ's decision in
Biehl, considered by tax experts to be the fundamental and correct stance of the
ECJ on income taxation, 1" ° would seem to extend far enough to have saved the
German national taxpayer, though a nonresident, in the Werner case. While
Sommerhalder's contention, discussed above, that the Werner decision cannot
be reconciled with Biehl stands recognized, the unavoidable distinction is that
Werner was a national in the state in which he was treated differently for tax
purposes. At first glance, this situation may appear to be an obvious example
of overt discrimination based on nationality. Nevertheless, it is necessary to keep
in mind the big picture. The ECJ has made it clear that it, but more likely the
Member States, is not yet ready to move to the point where the Community can
infringe on the sovereignty of the Member States regarding internal tax matters.
However, the burden placed on Member States in justifying discriminatory tax
treatment is a heavy one. The efforts at harmonization, nevertheless, have been
significant, as demonstrated by the next case discussed.
6. The Commerzbank Case
The ECJ's decision in the Commerzbank 3' case could, in the mind of at least
one tax expert, "have far-reaching implications throughout the EC and could
spell the end of discrimination in tax matters." 132 The vast impact the decision
has already had on U.K. law, and will very likely have on the tax law of other

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
1-4017,
132.

Van Thiel, supra note 9, at 306.
Sommerhalder, supra note 22, at 103.
Biehl, [1990] E.C.R. 1-1779, paras. 15 and 16.
Id. para. 15.
Id. paras. 12, 14.
Van Thiel, supra note 9, at 305.
Case 330/91, R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, exparte Commerzbank AG, 1993 E.C.R.
3 C.M.L.R. 457 (1993).
Les Secular, Discrimination within the EC-Is This the End?, 33 EUR. TAX. 345 (1993).
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Member States, can be attributed to the ECJ's broad interpretation of the equal
treatment and nondiscrimination principles under Community law. The decision
seemed all but to eliminate the possibility of a Member State's being able to
provide a satisfactory justification for utilizing discriminatory tax provisions.
Commerzbank, a bank incorporated under German law, maintained a branch
in the United Kingdom through which it granted loans to a number of U.S.
companies. 131 Commerzbank paid tax on the interest it received from those companies.13 4 The bank then sought repayment of the tax from the Inland Revenue
under the provisions of a double taxation agreement between the United Kingdom,
Northern Ireland, and the United States. 135 That agreement provided that interest
paid by a U.S. company to only a U.K. company or a company resident for tax
36
purposes in the United Kingdom would be taxable in the United Kingdom.
Because Commerzbank was not a U.K. resident for tax purposes, it received a
refund of the overpaid tax. 13 However, Commerzbank did not stop there. It then
made a claim for repayment under section 825 of the Income and Corporation
Taxes Act 1988.138 The U.K. tax authorities refused this claim on the ground
that Commerzbank was not a resident company of the United Kingdom and,
therefore, did not qualify for the repayment.1 39 Referring to its decision in the
Avoir Fiscalcase, the ECJ held:
Articles 52 and 58 EC prevent the legislation of a member-State from granting repayment
supplement on overpaid tax to companies which are resident for tax purposes in that
State whilst refusing the supplement to companies which are resident for tax purposes
in another member-State. The fact that the latter would not have been exempt 1from tax
if they had been resident in that State if [sic] of no relevance in that regard. 4
The final sentence of this holding enables the ramifications of this decision to
be potentially widespread. The message seems to be that discrimination is discrimination. Even though the discrimination may appear to be reasonable and justified,
based on the different situations of the resident and nonresident companies with
respect to the repayment of taxes, the distinction was found by the ECJ to amount
to unequal treatment. 141 The rule was discriminatory despite "[tihe fact that the
exemption from tax which
gave rise to the refund was available only to non42
resident companies." 1

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Commerzbank, 1993 E.C.R. 1-4017, at 471, para. 4.
Id.
Id. at 471, para. 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 471, para. 6.
Id. at 472, para. 8.
Id. at 474, para. 20 (emphasis added).
Id. at 474, para. 19.
Id.
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The broad interpretation of the ECJ is clearly indicative of an increasing effort
to harmonize Member State tax laws. The decision could reasonably be viewed as
an effort to minimize and eventually eliminate the need for Member State doubletaxation agreements with one another. The greater the harmonization, the less need
there will be for such agreements. As Secular points out, much litigation will likely
ensue from this decision, as an array of potentially discriminatory Member3 State
tax laws are brought into question in light of the Commerzbank decision. 14
As we have already seen in the Schumacker decision, the German tax authorities
have significantly softened their position with regard to granting tax advantages
to individuals who make most of their income from employment in Germany.
The changes the U.K. Inland Revenue has already implemented are striking and
provide a much-needed demonstration of pro-EC enthusiasm from the oftenhesitant United Kingdom.'44 Other areas of nondiscrimination in which the Commerzbank decision could have an impact include: nonresident exclusions from
a number of personal allowances in Belgium; a French real property tax levied
on foreign companies and a thin capitalization provision to which only foreign
companies are subject; and the nonresident exclusions from personal deductions
and beneficial tax rates in the Netherlands. 145 It will only be a matter of time
before these and other likely discriminatory Member State tax provisions are
brought for review before the ECJ.
Ill. The ECJ's Changing Role
While the potential methods the EC may implement in an effort to harmonize
further Member State tax laws is beyond the scope of this Comment,46 the more
frequent use of the article 177 procedure"17 in conjunction with the case law of
the ECJ establishing the supremacy of Community law over national law indicates
that the role of the ECJ is changing. In the United States, the U.S. Supreme
Court serves primarily in an appellate role for constitutional issues that it must
resolve in the interests
of legal certainty and equality-two general principles of
48
Community law.
143. Secular, supra note 132, at 346.
144. Within months of the ECJ's Commerzbank decision, the Inland Revenue issued a press release
extending a repayment supplement to individuals and companies for a year of assessment in which
the individual or company is resident in a Member State other than the United Kingdom on the same
basis as payments are made to U.K. residents and encouraging them to make a claim for such a
repayment supplement. Id. at 345 (Editor's Note), 346.
145. Id. at 347.
146. See Brinkmann & Riecker, supra note 4, for a discussion of the findings of the Ruding
Committee in this regard.
147. The more frequent use of the article 177 procedure is perhaps due to the ECJ's more restricted
use of the procedures outlined in articles 173 and 215. See generally Paul P. Craig, Legality, Standing
and Substantive Review in Community Law, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 507 (1994).
148. DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 91-97 (3d ed. 1993).
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An interesting theory advanced by Rasmussen suggests that a similar role may
be a goal that the ECJ has in mind for the future.' 49 The ECJ's interests in establishing such a system-which would likely expand the role of the existing court of first
instance or other yet-to-be-established lower courts-are thought to be greater than
a citizen's interest in having direct access to the ECJ. 0 Rasmussen points to other
equally restrictive EC Treaty provisions (175 and 215) to support the notion that
the ECJ seeks to establish itself as the high appellate court for the Community. 5'
He also points to the court of first instance to relieve the ECJ of certain cases, such
as those concerning staff, and more generally, to allow itself to concentrate on
matters of law, to be a step in this direction.1 52 And of particular relevance to this
Comment, the encouragement of the use of the indirect route to the ECJ through
article 177 also suits the appellate objectives of the ECJ. 153While Craig challenges
Rasmussen's theories as to why the ECJ has been restrictive in terms of citizen
access to the ECJ and has encouraged the use of the article 177 procedure, his challenges are not convincing. 154 Rasmussen's theory is very forward looking in its
demonstration of the ECJ's desire to take on a role more similar to that of the U.S.
Supreme Court, while a more expansive system develops below it to allow for the
more efficient and efficacious workings of the EC as a whole.
IV. Some Final Comments Concerning Discrimination in the
Direct Taxation Context
The principle of nondiscrimination, as well as the other general principles of
the EC,1 55 is a necessary tool for the interpretation of laws and in determining
whether those laws coincide with the spirit and objectives of the EC Treaty and
the general interest of the EC. The ECJ's actions in this regard seem to indicate
a desire to take on a new role, while in the meantime realizing that much work
remains to be done. The development of such a complex "federal" legal system
is a slow process. The inclusion of nations of such various histories and cultures
into one Community requires flexibility in the early stages. Though taking account
of these differences, the ECJ has, nevertheless, stuck to the primary objective
56
of the EC: "an ever closer union.'
The effects that a Member State's tax laws have on the internal market and
the movement of nationals across the Community frontiers is significant. The
decisions of the ECJ, in its efforts to curtail the negative impact that these national
149. Craig, supra note 147, at 521 (citing Hjaltc Rasmussen, Why is Article 173 Interpreted
Against PrivatePlaintiffs? 5 EUR. L. REV. 112, 122).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 521-22.
152. Id. at 521.
153. Id. at 522.
154. Id. at 521-22.
155. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 148, at 88-103.
156. EC Treaty preamble, supra note 3.
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laws may have on the workings of the internal market, demonstrate the Community-wide need for greater harmonization and uniformity of laws. However, until
further harmonization or uniformity of laws becomes the status quo, differences
will persist, and with those differences will arise situations in which it may appear
that a particular EC citizen is being discriminated against. The decisions of the
ECJ, in its efforts to harmonize further the tax laws of the Member States and
lay down "the law of the land," have been surprisingly well received by the
Member States and must be considered a step in the right direction.
V. Liability of Member States and the Possibility of Damages under the
Brasserie du PecheurCase
The following review highlights the ECJ's intolerance regarding Member
States' "unconstitutional" provisions in violation of Community law. Whether
within the taxation context or within the general civil context, the ECJ clearly
recognizes and rules against Member States guilty of such violations. Without
such judgments the unification of the EC system would be impossible. Whether
damages may be collected presents an issue of first impression in the EC system.
The progression of Community law indicates that liability of violating Member
States includes damages to injured parties.
A.

MEMBER STATE LIABILITY FOR FAILING TO IMPLEMENT A REGULATION-

THE FRANCOVICH PERSPECTIVE

1. Overview of Francovich
A discussion regarding the applicability of damages against a Member State
must begin with an overview of a seminal case decided by the ECJ, Francovich
v. The Republic (Italy). 57 The ECJ in Francovich considered a claim against
Italy involving the nonimplementation of a directive,"' the question presented
being whether Member States should have created guaranty funds for employees
when employers went bankrupt.' 59 The issue was whether in the spirit of EC
law, a government has to pay damages in a case where it failed to implement
an EC directive,'60 The ECJ found that Member States that fail to implement a
directive are liable to an injured party if three prerequisites are met: (1) the goal

157. Joined cases 6/90 & 9/90, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66 (1991).
158. Id. at 108-09
159. Id. at 109.
160. Melanie Ogren, Francovich v. Italian Republic: Should Member States be Directly Liable
for Nonimplementation of European Union Directives?7 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 583, 589 (1994). The
three prerequisites established in Francovichare based on Community law as opposed to the Member
States' laws. When discussing the first element of the rights of an individual, it is important to note
a term of art, "subjektives offevtliches Recht," which translates to a "subjective public claim." As
opposed to a claim against a private individual, this subjective public claim is required almost as
an element of "standing" in the German courts. Such "standing" is required in order to sue Member
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of the directive is to grant legal rights to individuals; (2) the rights must be clear
and easily ascertained from the directive; and (3)there must be a causal connection
between the infringement of the Member State obligation to comply with the
directive and the actual damage to the individual. 16' The directive provision in

not give Member States a choice as to how the provision is to be
question must 62

implemented. 1
The ECJ's three prerequisites requiring enforcement of liability in this case
complied with article 5 of the EC Treaty, which states: "Member States shall
take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment
of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by
They shall facilitate the achievement of the
the institutions of the' Community.
63
Community's tasks.'

B.

BRASSERIE DU PECHEUR

1. Facts of the Case
In Francovich the ECJ established the principle that the failure of a Member

State to conform its law to an EC directive can result in liability of that Member
State towards an individual.'64 In the case of Brasseriedu Pecheur, the plaintiff, a
French brewery, demanded 1.8 million deutschmarks (approximately 1.2 million
U.S. dollars) in damages from the Federal Republic of Germany.165 The plaintiff
brewery asserted that its beer exports to Germany were stopped in 1981 because
the French beer did not comply with the German beer purity laws.'6 The plaintiff
relied on the 1987 ECJ decision that found the German law regarding beer purity
in noncompliance with Community law based on Germany's prohibition of the
sale of beer legally produced and marketed in another Member State if it was
States or entities for not complying with the contents of a subjective public claim. Additionally, the
second requirement almost equates a requirement for precisenessin the directive. The directive must
be sufficiently precise to assign certain rights to an individual and the rights must be determined on
the basis of the directive. See Martin Zenner, EuroparechtVolkerrecht, Studien und Materialien,Die
Haftung der EG-Mitgliedstaatenfur die Anwendung europarechtswidrigerRechtsnormen, KONSTANZ
UNIV. DISSERTATION 26-43 (1995).

161. EC TREATY art. 5; Ogren, supra note 160, at 600. The stated task of the EC Treaty is found
in article 2, which states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout
the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and
balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of
living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.
EC TREATY art. 2.

162. Id.
163. Francovich v. The Republic (Italy), [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. at 86.
164. Brasserie du Pecheur Sa v. Bundesrepublik Deuschland, 1992 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH],
EUROPAEISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [EuZW] 226.
165. Id.; see Bierstevergesetz, v. 14.3.1952 (BGBI. I.S. 1449) regarding beer purity restrictions/
qualifications.
166. Brasserie du Pecheur Sa v. Bundesrepublik Deuschland, 1992 BGH at 227.
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not brewed in accordance with the purity law. 67 The court of appeals in Germany
had rejected the plaintiff's claim and the German Federal Supreme Court (GFSC),
according to article 177 of the EC Treaty, wanted the ECJ to clarify if and68how
a cause of action for damages can be derived from the Community law. 1
2. Questions Raised by the German FederalSupreme Court
The first issue that the GFSC requested the ECJ to resolve was whether the
principle of Member State liability obligates the Member State to pay damages
to an individual who might have suffered damages due to infringements of Community law, for which the Member State was responsible. The court found that
the German beer purity law was not adjusted to the EC law, which is supreme,
69
and therefore was not in compliance with article 30 of the EC Treaty.
The second issue raised by the GFSC was whether it is possible to apply
Member State law to determine that a cause of action for damages is subject to
the same restrictions applicable in the case of an infringement of Member State
law or supreme national law. 70
The third issue raised by the GFSC was whether it is possible for Member
State law to make the cause of action for damages dependent upon some additional
element of fault, intention, or171negligence on the part of the responsible public
servants or people in charge.
The fourth and final issue raised by the GFSC hinged on the resolution of the
first two issues. If the first issue is affirmed and the second issue is denied:
(1) can the obligation for damages be restricted according to Member State law
to the recovery of damages to certain individual rights (property) or are damages
such as lost profits recoverable; and (2) is it necessary that the obligation extends
to those damages that existed before the 1987 ECJ judgment finding section 10
72
of the German Beer Tax Act in noncompliance with article 30 of the EC Treaty. 1
3. Discussion of the Application of Member State Law in the Context of
Community Law-Findings of the GFSC
The cause of action brought in this case was not recognized by the GFSC
under German domestic law. The GFSC found the asserted wrong, which con167. Id.; the GFSC places special emphasis on whether a principle of Community law exists that
obligates Member States to such damages.
168. Brasserie, 1992 BGH at 227.
169. Id.; article 30 of the EC Treaty states: "Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures
having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between
Member States." EC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 30.
170. Brasserie, 1992 BGH at 227. The court provides an example such as in the case of an
infringement of a simple parliamentary act against the German Constitution (questioning if the same
principles of state liability due to nonconformance with the German Constitution apply under Community law). See the following discussion of the "supremacy of primary remedies."
171. Id.
172. Id.
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sisted of an omission of the federal legislators (noncompliance or nonadjustment
of former section 10 of the German Beer Tax Act with supreme regulations of
to section
Community law), did not violate any official obligations in relation
73
839 BGB and was therefore not actionable under German law.1
The GFSC attempted to draw an analogy in this case between a concept similar
to the American concept of "eminent domain" in German law, which gives a
cause of action and a right to recover damages if a state or government takes an
individual's tangible property. 174 A German doctrine developed by scholars and
acknowledged by German courts as an "eminent domain-like" cause of action
applies if an individual suffers a loss by the state or state action (not real property). 175 In the Brasserie case, the GFSC denied application of this "eminent
domain-like" doctrine for recovery of damages. 76 As a result, the court questioned to what end an individual is entitled to lost profit due to a state action77
under this doctrine whether through limitations, requirements, or prerequisites. 1
In its analysis of whether a direct cause of action derived through European
law, the court reiterated the holding in Francovich affirming the direct liability
7
of Member States towards an individual for noncompliance of an EC directive. 1
In submitting certain questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling under article
177 of the EC Treaty, the GFSC set forth the general principles of state liability
found in Francovich as follows: (1) the EC Treaty set up its own legal system
that has been implemented in the national legal systems of the Member States
and is to be applied by Member State courts; and (2) legal subjects (natural
persons holding rights) in the sense of German legal doctrine are not only Member
States, but the individuals of Member States and the rights arising therefrom
can apply if there are obligations imposed on the Member States with respect to
the individual. ' As in Francovich, the Member States' national courts must
warrant full effectiveness of those provisions and must protect the rights of the
individuals being assigned by the EC Treaty.180 If individuals do not have the

173. Id.; see Buergerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 839. The official obligations of public servants
or people in charge serve the interests of the Community (interests of all people) termed a general
interest. Under German law this interest as previously discussed as a "subjective public right" is
a requirement for a cause of action. Without this special relationship between these official duties
and certain groups of individuals, it is not possible for third parties to recover damages. Certain
exceptions termed "individual acts/measure acts" identify certain interests of individuals that may
be effected. Those can be regarded as third persons in the sense of § 839 BGB. The plaintiff in this
case was not a third party and therefore does not raise a "subjective public right" and the procedural
rule necessary for state liability requiring the cause of action be in the interest of general people is
not met. Id.
174. Brasserie, 1992 BGH at 227; GRUNDGESETZ [CoNSTITUTION] [GG] art. 14 (F.R.G.).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Brasserie, 1992 BGH at 227.
179. Id.
180. Francovich v. The Republic (Italy), [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66, 86 (1991).
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possibility to demand damages based on a cause of action that their rights were
violated by an infringement of EC law by a Member State, the full effectiveness
of those European provisions would be restricted and the protection would be
diminished. 18'
C.

THE

ECJ's

DECISION

1. Member State Liability-Generally
On March 5, 1996, the ECJ released its decision in the Brasserie case.' 82 The
ECJ began its decision with a brief look at the possibility of a Member State's
obligation to compensate individuals for violations of Community law attributable
to a Member State's legislative action. 8 3 As previously discussed, Francovich
and other cases have indicated the ECJ's consistent belief that effective provisions
of the EC treaty are a minimum guarantee of rights to an individual in an attempt
to "ensure that provisions of Community law prevail over national provisions."' 14
Rights directly conferred by a Community provision that provides redress to an
individual before the national courts must be followed with a right to reparation
for any damages sustained. 81 5 The division of powers within each Member State
must not affect an individual's right to reparation. Therefore, the ECJ found that
regardless of the "organ" of the state that caused the violation, the principle of
state liability to individuals remains. 186
2. Conditionsfor Liability
In situations in which wide discretion is provided to the Member State (such
as the restriction of beer in the Brasserie case), uniformity must be established
as to when Member States will incur liability. 87 In cases of wide discretion,

181. Id. at 86. Therefore, in the case of an omission of Member States, an individual can go to
the courts and claim rights assigned to them by Community law. As in Francovich, the court identifies
article 5 of the EC Treaty and the obligation of the Member States to take all suitable measures of
a general or special nature to fulfill their obligations under Community law. Among those obligations

is the duty to provide a remedy for the unlawful consequences of an infringement of Community
law.
182. Brasserie du Pecheur Sa v. Bundegrepublik Deuschland, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889.
183. Id. at 983-86.
184. Id. at 985.
185. Id. Community liability for the exercise of legislative activities is based on two considerations:
(1) the Community interests may override individual interests, and the legislature should therefore
not be restricted from acting; and (2) the legislature generally acts on behalf of the entire community,
and therefore only grave and manifest disregard for the limitations on the legislative powers may
result in community liability.
186. Id. at 986 (stating that the rules relating to liability for legislative measures include "the
complexity of the situations to be regulated, difficulties in the application or interpretation of the

texts and, more particularly, the margin of discretion available to the author of the act in question. ")
187. Id. at 989. For a more recent decision following the ECJ's decision, see The Queen and

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedly Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., Case 5/94 1996
WL J0005.
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three conditions must be met prior to an individual's right to reparation: "the
rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach
must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal link between the
breach of the obligation resting on the state and the damage sustained by the
injured parties." 188 To determine the manifest and grave disregard for discretional
limits, the ECJ may consider factors including any available excuses, whether
a Community institution contributed to the omission, whether the authorities had
broad discretion, whether the violation was intentional, and whether the rule
violated was sufficiently clear to the Community.' 89 The ECJ indicated that any
subsequent violation following a judgment would clearly denote a serious infringement of an individual's rights. '9 Likewise, a Member State's failure to adopt
and comply with measures passed by the EC would be a clear indicator of a
serious breach of Community law.' 91
Since the determinations regarding violations are made by the national courts,
some existing national laws may restrict the type or amount of reparation a state
must make to an individual.1 92 These limitations may cause problems when dealing
with Member States in which the domestic laws of the State restrict noncontractual
liability, therefore limiting the individual's right to reparations guaranteed under
Community law.' 93 Any such domestic law that violates or inhibits an individual's
rights under Community law must be set aside in order to insure the effectiveness
of Community law. 94
3. The Element of Fault
The variations between the Member States' approach to state liability demonstrates the lack of uniformity in the collection of damages as well as the laws
of each government regarding torts. 195 The varying approaches raise a question
188. Brasserie, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 985.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 990 ("A breach will be sufficiently serious if it has persisted despite being the subject
of a court ruling or it is clear in the light of settled case law. The German purity law was thus not
an excusable error in the light of earlier decisions of the European court." Law: EU States Liability
Ruling-European Court, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1996 at 14).
191. Brasserie, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 990.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 992.
194. Id.
195. Walter Van Gerven, Bridging the Gap Between the Community andNational Laws: Towards
a Principleof Homogeneity in the Filing of Legal Remedies? 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 679, 696
(1995).
Thus, in various countries, some of which belong to the common law group (England,
Ireland) whereas others belong to the Romanistic group (Belgium, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands), state liability is governed by the same rules as the liability of individuals and is based on fault or negligence, breach of statutory duty, etc. In other countries
(like France, Greece, Italy and Spain) the liability of the State is engaged in principle
by virtue of an objective illegal act, or of harm done to property as a subjective right,
or (as in Germany) by virtue of intentional or negligent exercise of public office.
VOL. 31, NO. 1

EC DIRECT TAXATION

189

as to an additional element of fault in such causes of action. 196 Naturally, most
Member States argue that an additional requirement of fault is desirable in an
attempt to shield governments from liability under Community law provisions.' 97
In a recent case before the ECJ, the Advocate General observed,
"A serious fault, defined as the breach of a clear provision of Community law (or of
a provision already interpreted by the court) or a repeated breach-or repeated despite
a judgment declaring that there has been a failure to fulfil obligations ought, without
doubt, to involve the State in liability.'I ' R
As applied to the Brasserie case, the element of fault could have been raised
in the context of the German government's failure to adjust its beer purity laws
to the Community standards or in the customs' officer's failure to interpret the
relevant laws with a view to the pertinent provisions of the EC Treaty. 199Issues
that might have been germane to such a determination of fault would include the
level of awareness of the German government as to the violation of Community
law, whether such inconsistencies were previously raised and disregarded, and
possibly the rationalization that the German government could provide for implementing a provision in violation of Community law.
4. Applicability of Article 215 of the EC Treaty
Arguably, article 215 provides a provision of noncontractual liability for the
ECJ to rely on in support of requiring an element of fault in a cause of action for
damages. 200 The problem of government liability was addressed in the Francovich
decision by Advocate General Mischo, who stated:
[T]he grant of damages by a national court for breach of Community law by a Member
State should be subject to the same conditions as an award of damages by the Court
of Justice for infringement of that same Community law by a Community institution.
This would make it possible to avoid a situation where, pursuant to Community law,
a Member State might incur liability for breach of Community law by one of its authori-

196. Id.
197. Michael Pimm, EU: Law-StateLiabilityforLegislationin BreachofECLaw, Reuter Textline
Lloyd's List, Dec. 2, 1994. Similarly, in an action for damages against the Commission, damage
arising from actions connected with fault are recoverable. K.P.E. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF JUSTICE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,

546-48 (2d ed. 1994).

198. Peter Duffy, European Briefing-Damages Against the State, SOLIC. J., July 7, 1995, at
655.
199. Brasserie, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 889. A question exists as to whether Germany was actually
aware of the violation of Community law. Should a distinction be drawn between a Member State
that establishes discriminatory norms in violation of Community law? Assuming the Member State
was unaware of the violation, shouldn't this lack of knowledge in some way mitigate or change the
damages issue?
200. EC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 215. Article 215 states:
The contractual liability of the Community shall be governed by the law applicable
to the contract in question. In the case of non-contractual liability, the Community
shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the memberStates, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the
performance of their duties.
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ties in circumstances where the non-contractual liability of the Community for breach
of Community law by one of its institutions would not arise. That seems to me to be
particularly necessary as the rules laid down in this regard by the Court on the basis
of the second paragraph of article 215 of the Treaty are said to flow from the general
principles common to the laws of the Member States.20
As previously stated, the Francovich decision detailed three requirements for
Member State liability for nonimplementation of Community law that excluded
a prerequisite in noncontractual liability of Community institutions under article
215 of a "fundamental breach of a superior rule of law." 20 2 The prerequisites
articulated in Francovich appear to be beneficial to claimants, while the prerequisite under article 215 does not afford the same benefits if the cause of action is
against a Community institution.2 3 The ECJ addressed the issue of fault in reparation determinations. The ECJ found that since each individual has a right to
reparation founded in Community law, any additional requirement of fault would
countermand the authority established by the Community. Therefore, the ECJ
determined that an additional element of fault would be unnecessary when determining whether an individual is entitled to reparation for injuries or damages
caused by a Member State or its legislative body. 204 The standard of a sufficient
Community law will be applied to such cases rather than an analysis
breach of
205
of fault.

D.

DAMAGES RECOVERABLE AND MITIGATION OF DAMAGES

1. Application of the Francovich Prerequisites
The Francovichprerequisites establish the requirements of state liability specifically in the context of the nonimplementation of a directive. 206 With the wide
latitude provided to broaden existing remedies of their national laws, Member
States may attempt to create a uniform application of their laws and Community
rules.20 7 Perhaps in an attempt to fulfill the Member States' obligations under
article 5 of the EC Treaty and "secure the uniform application of Community
law in all Member States," the outlined Francovich prerequisites should have
208
been applied in the Brasserie case.

201. Roberto Caranta, Judicial Protection Against Member States: A New Jus Commune Takes
Shape, 32

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

COMMON MKT.

L. REV. 703, 723 (1995).

Id.
Id. at 724.
Brasserie, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 993.
Id. at 993-94.
Francovich, 2 C.M.L.R. at 86.

207. Van Gerven, supra note 195, at 693. Walter Van Gerven, Bridging the Gap Between the
Community and NationalLaws: Towards a Principleof Homogeneity in the Fieldof Legal Remedies?
32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 679, 693 (1995).
208. Van Gerven, supra note 207, at 692. Such uniformity would provide an element of predictability in the recovery of damages.
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2. Additional Prerequisites
One might conclude that the ECJ's delineation of three prerequisites in Francovich prescribes part or all of the requirements necessary to enforce Member
State liability. 209 If this proposition is correct, then the assumption may be raised
that any remaining prerequisites, since not found in the Community law, must
be taken from the procedural and substantive law of the Member States. 210 "A
clear-cut choice underlies the questions: either liability is to be governed in its
details by national law, or the Court has to develop the seminal conditions set
widening the jus commune
out in Francovichto an ever greater detail, therefore
21
emerging in the field of governmental liability.' 1
3. Damages Recoverable-Generally
Differing opinions abound as to what damages should be recoverable under
a cause of action similar to the Brasserie case. One commentator has suggested
that if the state is liable in its legislative capacity, the injured party is entitled
to a type of restitution damages compensating the party in full and placing the
party in the same position it would have been but for the violation of Community
law.212 Cases dealing with compensation in the context of article 215 consider
whether the injured party was able to pass on claimed damages to its customers. 13
Other commentators reiterate this general restitution proposition
including dam214
ages such as material damage or loss and lost profits.
In Brasserie, the ECJ determined that calculations of the amount of reparation
for each individual's loss or damage require that the loss or damage from a
violation of Community law be "commensurate with the loss or damage sustained
so as to ensure the effective protection for [the individual's] rights." 2 1 5 Should
the Community law not provide a calculation for the damages, each Member
State's legal system must establish the criteria for reparation.216 Since Member
States may be tempted to avoid any reparation at all, the criteria established for
violations of Community law must not be any less favorable to the individual
than the criteria applied to similar claims under the Member States' domestic
law.217 A Member State may not make reparation impossible or overly difficult
to obtain. 1

209. Zenner, supra note 160, at 43.
210. Id. If such state liability is applied, however, the law must be interpreted in the spirit of
the Community law.
211. Caranta, supra note 201, at 770.
212. Duffy, supra note 198.
213. Case 238/78, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council and Commission of EC.
214. Zenner, supra note 160, at 69.
215. Brasserie, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 994.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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4. Mitigation of Damages-Supremacyof Primary Remedies
Injured parties may recover through two alternative routes, primary remedies
and secondary remedies. 2 9 Primary remedies can be provided by challenging an
administrative decision rather than suing the Member State directly.220 Secondary
remedies, however, attempt to collect damages via a cause of action demanding
damages.221 Such a distinction between remedies has an effect in those jurisdictions that recognize a supremacy of primary remedies in the recognition of mitigation and calculation of damages.222
In the ECJ, no general supremacy of Member State primary legal protection
or remedies is recognized.223 However, German state liability law, section 839
BGB, is dominated by a general supremacy of the primary legal protection or
remedies.224 As a result, if an injured party could avoid damages by filing an
administrative action, the failure to do so is considered a failure to mitigate.225
Injured parties are therefore forced to go through primary remedies first and, if
they fail to do so, are not entitled to damages that they could have avoided.226
Had the ECJ chosen to recognize such a supremacy of primary remedies or
protection in cases of administrative wrongs, the calculation of damages in the
Brasseriecase could have been altered by the plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to secondary remedies under Francovich.227
The ECJ in Brasseriedetermined that mitigation of damages may be considered
when determining the amount of reparation appropriate for an individual's damages or loss. National courts may consider "whether the injured person showed
reasonable diligence in order to avoid the loss or damage or limit its extent and
whether, in particular, he availed himself in time of all the legal remedies available
to him.' 228 This provision for mitigation mirrors a principle common to the
Member States in which injured parties risk bearing the loss himself absent demonstrating an attempt to limit the loss or damage through reasonable diligence.229
In Brasserie, the ECJ was careful to point out that damages from lost profits
would not be excluded.230 Specifically in the cases of economic or commercial
219. Zenner, supra note 160, at 146.
220. Id. Such a remedy generally can avoid damages if the party obtained enough protection by
going through the administrative agency process.
221. Id. Such a cause of action would be analyzed as per the Francovich prerequisites in addition
to the respective Member State's prerequisites. Id. at 314.
222. Id. at 146.
223. Id. at 150.
224. Id. at 154.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 182.
227. Id. at 77. The plaintiff in Brasserie could have tried to revoke the provision directly under
an administrative procedure for violation of article 30.
228. Brasserie, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 994.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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litigation, the complete exclusion of such damages would not comply with the
court's requirement that reparation not be unduly difficult or impossible to obtain.231 Similarly, an award of exemplary damages is not precluded in instances
in which a Member State's domestic law provides for such damages in similar
claims or actions.232
5. Mitigation of Damages-Application of the Sabena Case in Determining
the Period of Time for the Calculation of Damages
The ECJ in the Sabena case discussed the calculation of past damages prior
to the institution of a suit in the context of a sex discrimination suit against a
Belgian airline.233 The ECJ held that "[i]important considerations of legal certainty affecting all the interests involved, both public and private, make it impossible in principle to reopen the question of pay as regards the past," thereby
effectively removing any recourse for damages prior to the institution of the
suit. 2 34 The court in Brasserie chose not to limit the damages that a plaintiff may
recover. 235
F. CONCLUSION
Applying the principles of Francovich and the goals of article 5 of the EC
Treaty, a compromising solution was appropriate for the ECJ in the Brasserie
case. As discussed in the first half of this article, Member States may be held
liable for tax violations under the ECJ. This type of liability infers the collection
of damages against a Member State. Therefore, the Brasserie decision will have
far-reaching implications in the field of damages.
The resolution of several difficult issues was imperative in the court's decision:
(1) whether the ECJ would create what is to be termed a "uniform law" fashioned
after the prerequisites of the Francovich decision; (2) whether an additional element of fault or other prerequisites may be added to determine Member State
liability; (3) what actions on the part of both parties will be considered in the
mitigation of damages; and (4) to what extent damages will be limited by the
1987 ECJ decision that found a violation of article 30.

231. Id.
232. Id. at 995.
233. See Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Soci6t6 Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aerienne
Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455.
234. Id.
235. The court extended the period covered by reparation to any time where it can be
proved that the damage was sufficiently serious. It added that the criteria for receiving
damages could not be different than those currently applied to domestic claims. But
it said the key issue was a citizen's right to a day in court.
Community Law: EU Court Upholds Individual's Rights Against Member States, EUR. REP.,

Mar. 9, 1996.
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The ECJ clearly indicated that uniformity is imperative among the Member
States in the determination of reparation to individuals for Member State violations
of Community law. Eliminating the element of fault, the ECJ based the award
of damages to an individual upon a serious violation of Community law. Although
the ultimate calculation of damages is left to the individual Member States and
the applicable domestic law, the ECJ clearly established that Member States
must not discriminate between violations of domestic or Community laws. Even
exemplary damages, if available in the Member State, may be awarded to an
individual. One clear premise is evident from the ECJ's decision: Member States
must comply with Community law or face reparations for noncompliance.
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